

# MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION: BEYOND THE CONSTANT ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION

陈真蔚 陈靛靛 陈楚棋 张嘉予 刘天宇



PART ONE

1

# Drawbacks of CES model and Introduction

## Drawbacks of CES model

- ✓ Preferences lack flexibility.
- ✓ Prices and markups are not affected by firm entry and market size.
- ✓ There is no scale effect, that is, the size of firms is independent of the number of consumers.
- ✓ Firms' price and size are independent from the geographical distribution of demand.

# Authors

- ✓ Evgeny Zhelobodko  
National Research University Higher School of Economics  
Monopolistic Competition
- ✓ Sergey Kokovin  
National Research University Higher School of Economics  
Graph , General equilibrium theory and Monopolistic competition
- ✓ Mathieu Parenti  
Catholic University of Louvain  
European Integration and International Trade
- ✓ Jacques François Thisse  
National Research University Higher School of Economics  
Spatial Economic

# Introduction



➤ preferences: additively separable across varieties

➤ relative love for variety, the elasticity of the marginal utility   $r_u(x) = \frac{1}{\sigma(x)}$

➤ The market outcome depends on how the relative love of variety varies with the consumption level

## Three extensions



➤ Multisector economy: a differentiated good X , a homogeneous good Y

➤ Heterogeneous firms: variable cost functions  $V(q, \theta)$

➤ Nonadditive preferences such as quadratic and translog (homogeneous firms and constant marginal costs)



PART TWO

2

The model

## Demand



$$\max_{x_i \geq 0} \mathcal{U} \equiv \int_0^N u(x_i) di \quad \text{such that} \quad \int_0^N p_i x_i di = E,$$



$$p_i(x_i) = u'(x_i)/\lambda,$$



$$\lambda = \frac{\int_0^N x_i u'(x_i) di}{E}.$$





$$r_u(x) \equiv -\frac{xu''(x)}{u'(x)} > 0.$$



$$\frac{1}{r_u(x)} = -\frac{1}{\mathcal{E}_p(x)} = -\mathcal{E}_x(p).$$



# Supply



$$\max_{q_i \geq 0} \pi(q_i) = R(q_i) - C(q_i) \equiv \frac{u'(q_i/L)}{\lambda} q_i - V(q_i) - F.$$

$$u'(q_i/L) + (q_i/L)u''(q_i/L) = \lambda V'(q_i),$$

$$[2 - r_{u'}(q_i/L)]r_u(q_i/L) - [1 - r_u(q_i/L)]r_C(q_i) > 0 \quad \text{for all } q_i \geq 0,$$

$$\mathcal{E}_R(\bar{x}) = \mathcal{E}_C(L\bar{x}), \quad \left| \right.$$



PART THREE

3

# The Market Outcome

## 3.1 Existence and Uniqueness of a FEE

### 1. Existence

$$\varepsilon_R(\bar{x}) = \varepsilon_C(L\bar{x})$$

$$0 \leq \varepsilon_C(0) < \varepsilon_R(0) < \infty, \quad \varepsilon_R(\infty) < \varepsilon_C(\infty)$$

### 2. Uniqueness

$$pq - V(q) = \frac{V'(q)}{1 - r_u(q/L)}q - V(q) = F$$

$$[2 - r'_u(q_i/L)]r_u(q_i/L) - [1 - r_u(q_i/L)]r_C(q_i) > 0$$

## 3.1 Existence and Uniqueness of a FEE

- **PROPOSITION 1**

If the above two conditions hold, then a unique FEE exists.

Furthermore, the FEE satisfies the conditions:

$$\begin{cases} \varepsilon_R(\bar{x}) = \varepsilon_C(L\bar{x}) \\ \bar{M} = r_u(\bar{x}) \\ \bar{q} = L\bar{x} \\ \bar{N} = EL/C(\bar{q}) \end{cases}$$

## 3.2 Market Size

L increases ( $L_1 \rightarrow L_2$ )





FIGURE 1.—Impact of  $L$  on the FEE under increasing RLV.

## 3.2 Market Size



Consumption per capita


$$\frac{d\bar{x}}{dL} < 0$$

An increasing RLV leads to a mild decline in consumption.


$$\bar{q} = L\bar{x}$$

Output

$$\frac{d\bar{q}}{dL} > 0$$



## 3.2 Market Size



Markup and Price

$$\bar{M} = r_u(\bar{x})$$

$$\bar{p} = \frac{C'(q)}{1 - r_u(\bar{x})}$$

$$\frac{d\bar{M}}{dL} < 0$$

$$\frac{d\bar{p}}{dL} < 0$$

Number of Varieties

$$\bar{N} = \frac{EL}{C(\bar{q})}$$

$$\frac{d\bar{N}}{dL} > 0$$





## 3.2 Market Size

- **PROPOSITION 2**

The properties of the market outcome are determined by the variety-loving attitude of consumers and not by the production conditions.

<i>Elasticity</i>	$r'_u(\bar{x}) > 0$	$r'_u(\bar{x}) = 0$	$r'_u(\bar{x}) < 0$
<i>Price <math>\bar{p}(L)</math></i>	$\mathcal{E}_{\bar{p}} < 0$	$\mathcal{E}_{\bar{p}} = 0$	$0 < \mathcal{E}_{\bar{p}}$
<i>Diversity <math>\bar{N}(L)</math></i>	$0 < \mathcal{E}_{\bar{N}} < 1$	$\mathcal{E}_{\bar{N}} = 1$	$1 < \mathcal{E}_{\bar{N}}$
<i>Consumption <math>\bar{x}(L)</math></i>	$-1 < \mathcal{E}_{\bar{x}} < 0$	$\mathcal{E}_{\bar{x}} = -1$	$\mathcal{E}_{\bar{x}} < -1$
<i>Output <math>\bar{q}(L)</math></i>	$0 < \mathcal{E}_{\bar{q}} < 1$	$\mathcal{E}_{\bar{q}} = 0$	$\mathcal{E}_{\bar{q}} < 0$



PART FOUR

4

# Derivation under CES

## Derivation under CES

ADD RELATED TITLE WORDS

The CES utility function:

$$u(x) = \frac{x^\rho}{\rho} \quad (\rho \leq 1 \text{ and } \rho \neq 0)$$

$$u'(x) = x^{\rho-1}, \quad u''(x) = (\rho - 1)x^{\rho-2}$$

Under the CES, *the relative love for variety* (RLV):

$$r_u(x) = -\frac{xu''(x)}{u'(x)} = -\frac{x \cdot (\rho - 1)x^{\rho-2}}{x^{\rho-1}} = 1 - \rho$$

## Derivation under CES

ADD RELATED TITLE WORDS

$$R = pq = \frac{Lxu'(x)}{\lambda}$$

$$\frac{dR}{dx} = \frac{L(u'(x) + xu''(x))}{\lambda}$$

The elasticity of  $R(x)$ :

$$\varepsilon_R = \frac{x}{R} \frac{dR}{dx} = \frac{u'(x) + xu''(x)}{u'(x)} = 1 + \frac{xu''(x)}{u'(x)} = 1 - r_u(x)$$

Under the CES:

$$\varepsilon_R = 1 - r_u(x) = 1 - (1 - \rho) = \rho$$

$$\varepsilon_u = \frac{x}{u} \frac{du}{dx} = \frac{x \cdot x^{\rho-1}}{\frac{x^\rho}{\rho}} = \rho$$

$$\varepsilon_R = \varepsilon_u$$

## Derivation under CES

ADD RELATED TITLE WORDS

<i>Elasticity</i>	$r'_u(\bar{x}) > 0$	$r'_u(\bar{x}) = 0$	$r'_u(\bar{x}) < 0$
<i>Price</i> $\bar{p}(L)$	$\mathcal{E}_{\bar{p}} < 0$	$\mathcal{E}_{\bar{p}} = 0$	$0 < \mathcal{E}_{\bar{p}}$
<i>Diversity</i> $\tilde{N}(L)$	$0 < \mathcal{E}_{\tilde{N}} < 1$	$\mathcal{E}_{\tilde{N}} = 1$	$1 < \mathcal{E}_{\tilde{N}}$
<i>Consumption</i> $\bar{x}(L)$	$-1 < \mathcal{E}_{\bar{x}} < 0$	$\mathcal{E}_{\bar{x}} = -1$	$\mathcal{E}_{\bar{x}} < -1$
<i>Output</i> $\bar{q}(L)$	$0 < \mathcal{E}_{\bar{q}} < 1$	$\mathcal{E}_{\bar{q}} = 0$	$\mathcal{E}_{\bar{q}} < 0$

In the CES case:

$$r_u(\bar{x}) = 1 - \rho \Rightarrow r'_u(\bar{x}) = 0$$

## Derivation under CES

ADD RELATED TITLE WORDS

$$\bar{q} = L\bar{x}$$

$$\frac{d\bar{q}}{dL} = \bar{x} + L \frac{d\bar{x}}{dL} = \bar{x} \left( 1 + \frac{L}{\bar{x}} \frac{d\bar{x}}{dL} \right) = \bar{x} (1 + \varepsilon_{\bar{x}/L})$$

$$\text{when } \frac{d\bar{q}}{dL} > 0, -1 < \varepsilon_{\bar{x}/L} < 0$$

$$\text{when } \frac{d\bar{q}}{dL} > 0, \varepsilon_{\bar{x}/L} < -1$$

In the CES case,  $\frac{d\bar{q}}{dL} = 0$  and thus:

$$\varepsilon_{\bar{x}/L} = -1$$

## Derivation under CES

ADD RELATED TITLE WORDS

$$\bar{P} = \frac{C'(\bar{q})}{1 - r_u(\bar{x})}$$

In the CES case,  $r_u(\bar{x}) = 1 - \rho$ ,  $\frac{d\bar{q}}{dL} = 0$  and thus:

$$\bar{P} = \frac{C'(\bar{q})}{\rho}$$

$$\frac{d\bar{P}}{dL} = \frac{C''(\bar{q})}{\rho} \frac{d\bar{q}}{dL}$$

$$\varepsilon_{\bar{P}} = \frac{L}{\bar{P}} \frac{d\bar{P}}{dL} = \frac{LC''(\bar{q})}{C'(\bar{q})} \frac{d\bar{q}}{dL} = 0$$

## Derivation under CES

ADD RELATED TITLE WORDS

$$\bar{N} = \frac{LE}{C(\bar{q})}$$

$$\frac{d\bar{N}}{dL} = \frac{E}{C(\bar{q})} - \frac{LEC'(\bar{q})}{C(\bar{q})^2} \frac{d\bar{q}}{dL}$$

$$\varepsilon_{\bar{N}} = \frac{L}{\bar{N}} \frac{d\bar{N}}{dL} = \frac{C(\bar{q})}{E} \left( \frac{E}{C(\bar{q})} - \frac{LEC'(\bar{q})}{C(\bar{q})^2} \frac{d\bar{q}}{dL} \right) = 1 - \frac{LC'(\bar{q})}{C(\bar{q})} \frac{d\bar{q}}{dL}$$

In the CES case,  $\frac{d\bar{q}}{dL} = 0$  and thus:

$$\varepsilon_{\bar{N}} = 1$$



# Derivation under CES

ADD RELATED TITLE WORDS



## Summary

1

The CES is the only function for which entry does not impact the equilibrium price.

2

Under the CES, equilibrium size of firms is independent of the market size.

3

Under the CES, individual welfare always increases with market size.



PART FIVE

5

**EXTENSIONS**

## EXTENSIONS

### INTRODUCTION

#### Multisector Economy


a two-sector economy

#### Nonadditive Preferences

the utility function is nonadditive

#### Heterogeneous Firms

firms with different cost



# EXTENSIONS

## Multisector Economy

1

Utility function

$$\max_{X, Y} U(X, Y) = U\left[\int_0^N u(x_i) di, Y\right]$$

2

Budget Constraint

Choosing the unit of the homogeneous good for the marginal productivity of labor to be equal to 1 and choosing the homogeneous good as the numéraire, the equilibrium wage is equal to 1.  $E$  is endogenous

$$\int_0^N p_i x_i di + Y = E + Y = 1$$

## EXTENSIONS

### Multisector Economy

3

For any given  $E$

$$\max_{x_i \geq 0} \int_0^N u(x_i) di$$

$$\text{s.t.} \quad \int_0^N p_i x_i di = E$$

4

Symmetry

$$v(p, N, E) \equiv Nu\left(\frac{E}{Np}\right)$$

5

The question is transformed into

$$\max_E U[v(p, E, n), 1 - E]$$

## EXTENSIONS

### Multisector Economy

6

For sufficient conditions, utilities  $U$  and  $u$  yield an expenditure function  $E(p, N)$  that satisfies the properties


$$0 \leq \frac{p}{E} \cdot \frac{\partial E}{\partial p} < 1 \quad \frac{N}{E} \cdot \frac{\partial E}{\partial N} < 1$$

7


It is proved that the equilibrium mass of varieties increases with  $L$  when the three inequilities above hold.

## EXTENSIONS


### Heterogeneous Firms



The firm's cost function is given by  $V(q, \theta)$  and  $V(q, \theta)$  is strictly increasing in  $\theta$  for all  $q > 0$ . The parameter  $\theta$  is distributed according to the continuous density  $\gamma(\theta)$  defined on  $[0, \infty)$



Firms face the same inverse demand function  $p_\theta(x_\theta) = u'(x_\theta)/\lambda$ . Spence-Mirrlees condition implies that lower  $\theta$  leads to greater output, lower price and higher profit.




$$\overline{M}_\theta = r_u(\overline{x}_\theta) = 1 / \sigma(\overline{x}_\theta)$$

## EXTENSIONS


### Heterogeneous Firms

$$\pi_0^*(\theta, \lambda; L) \equiv \max_{q \geq 0} \left\{ \frac{u'(q/L)}{\lambda} q - V(q, \theta) \right\}$$



• Cut-off efficiency index

$$\pi_0^*(\bar{\theta}, \lambda; L) - F = 0$$




• The free entry condition can be written as

$$\int_0^{\bar{\theta}(\lambda; L)} [\pi_0^*(\theta, \lambda; L) - F] \gamma(\theta) d\theta - F_e = 0$$




## EXTENSIONS

### Heterogeneous Firms



The partial derivative of  $\pi_0^*$  with respect to  $L$

$$\frac{\partial \pi_0^*}{\partial L} + \frac{\partial \pi_0^*}{\partial \bar{\theta}} \frac{d\bar{\theta}}{dL} + \frac{\partial \pi_0^*}{\partial \bar{\lambda}} \frac{d\bar{\lambda}}{dL} = 0$$



Transform

$$\varepsilon_{\bar{\theta}} = \frac{r(\bar{q}_{\bar{\theta}} / L) - \varepsilon_{\bar{\lambda}}}{\bar{\theta} \cdot \frac{\partial V(\bar{\theta})}{\partial \theta}} \quad \int_0^{\bar{\theta}} [r_u(\bar{q}_{\bar{\theta}} / L) - r_u(\bar{q}_{\theta} / L)] \bar{R}(\theta) \gamma(\theta) d\theta$$

## EXTENSIONS

### Heterogeneous Firms

$$\varepsilon_{\bar{\theta}} = \frac{r(\bar{q}_{\bar{\theta}} / L) - \varepsilon_{\bar{\lambda}}}{\bar{\theta} \cdot \frac{\partial V(\bar{\theta})}{\partial \theta}}$$

$$\int_0^{\bar{\theta}} [r_u(\bar{q}_{\bar{\theta}} / L) - r_u(\bar{q}_{\theta} / L)] \bar{R}(\theta) \gamma(\theta) d\theta$$

# EXTENSIONS

## Nonadditive Preferences

### subutility function

utility gained from  
consuming  $x_i$

$$u(x_i, X) = x_i - \frac{x_i^2}{2} - \gamma x_i \int_0^N x_j dj$$

### inverse demand function

linear U and Lagrange  
multiplier equals 1

$$p(x_i, X) = 1 - x_i - \gamma X$$

### RLV

price-increasing  
regime

$$r_u(\bar{x}) = \frac{\bar{x}}{x + c}$$

## EXTENSIONS

### Nonadditive Preferences

**demand for  
variety i**

translog expenditure  
function

$$d(p_i; \Lambda_{trans}, L) = \frac{L}{p_i} (\Lambda_{trans} - \beta \ln p_i)$$

constant absolute  
risk-aversion function

$$d(p_i; \Lambda_{cara}, L) = \frac{L}{p_i} (\Lambda_{cara} - \beta \ln p_i)$$

**equilibrium  
price**

translog expenditure  
function

$$\beta(p - c)^2 / p = cf / L$$

constant absolute  
risk-aversion function

$$\beta(p - c)^2 / p = f / L$$

**result**

the market outcome under the nonadditive translog  
behaves like  
the market outcome under the additive CARA utility